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This paper examines the effect of employment protection regulation on gross job 
flows in a sample of developed and developing countries. By implementing a 
differences-in-differences test we lessen the potentially severe endogeneity and 
omitted variable problems associated with cross-country regressions. This test is 
based on the hypothesis that job security regulations are more binding in some 
sectors of economic activity than in others, depending on sector-specific 
characteristics such as the variance of demand or technological shocks. Unlike 
most of the existing literature, our analysis indicates that more stringent job 
security regulations slow down gross job flows, and this tendency is more 
pronounced in sectors that require higher labor flexibility. These effects occur 
within the sample of developed and developing countries and are very large in 
magnitude. Moreover, these effects are robust to changes in regulatory measures, 
measurement of sector flexibility requirements, control variables and samples.  
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  3  41. Introduction 
 
A large and growing body of literature has found that a substantial share of productivity growth 
is associated with the reallocation of workers from less productive to more productive firms, and 
from underperforming firms exiting the market to new entrants.
2 In this context, it has been 
argued that regulations that prevent the reallocation of workers across firms may significantly 
hinder productivity growth.  Yet, while many economic models predict that regulations that 
restrict employment-at-will reduce gross job flows, empirical studies have failed to find a 
conclusive causal relation.
3  Thus, much of the evidence so far available suggests that all 
countries have high rates of job reallocation and that the levels of job reallocation are not 
significantly correlated with the stringency of regulations.
4 
This puzzling evidence has spurred substantial modeling efforts to complement earlier 
models of employment protection legislation (EPL), such as Bertola (1990) and Hopenhayn and 
Rogerson (1993), with features that can accommodate the apparent lack of relationship between 
employment protection and job reallocation. Bertola and Rogerson (1997) amend Bertola (1990) 
by introducing wage bargaining institutions. They argue that countries with strict EPL are also 
countries with very centralized wage bargaining, and that they are consequently characterized by 
significant wage compression. Faced with a negative shock, firms in countries with rigid wages 
may end up shedding more labor than firms in countries with less strict EPL and lower wage 
compression. Boeri (1999) states that in countries with strict EPL, firms circumvent regulations 
by hiring workers on short-term contracts. This again results in high flows despite stringent 
employment regulations.  Following a different line of inquiry, Blanchard and Portugal (2001) 
argue that the frequency at which the data is analyzed matters; while employment protection 
regulations may smooth short-term fluctuations, they might be less effective in preventing flows 
that result from permanent shocks. Consistent with this notion, they find evidence that, while 
annual job flows are quite similar in the relatively flexible United States and in relatively rigid 
Portugal, quarterly job flows are much smaller in the latter.  
                                                           
2 See, for instance, Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (1997) or Scarpetta, Hemmings, Tressel et al. (2002). 
3 Bertola and Rogerson, (1997); Alogoskoufis, Bean, Bertola et al. (1995); OECD (1996 and 1999); Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1999). See Bertola (1990) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) for two models where employment 
protection slows down labor reallocation. 
4 The only study that finds a negative and statistically significant relation between EPL and job reallocation is 
Gómez-Salvador, Messina and Vallanti (2003) for a cross section of 12 countries. Garibaldi, Konings and Pisarides 
  5While the arguments above are important in developing any theory of how regulations 
affect gross job flows, one fundamental problem remains: measuring the causal relationship 
between labor market regulations and job flows is a difficult and by no means well-accomplished 
task. Therefore, conjectures based on such weak estimates may be unwarranted.  Most 
estimations of the relationship between job turnover and labor market regulations use bivariate or 
multivariate cross-country analysis.
5 Such methodology, while suggestive, cannot control for a 
host of unobservable variables that are likely to be correlated with turnover and regulatory 
measures, potentially biasing the estimates. 
First, in the majority of cases, the estimates do not control for the size or the variability of 
the shocks facing each country. Moreover, since countries that experience high turnover rates 
may have a high demand for strict employment protection regulations, cross-country studies are 
biased toward finding a positive relationship between labor market regulations and gross job 
flows.
6 Second, existing cross-section estimates do not account for the fact that turnover 
measures vary across countries, which introduces substantial measurement error into the 
dependent variable. Thus, for instance, in some countries reallocation is measured at the firm 
level, while in others, it is collected from plant-level information. The two measures are not 
strictly comparable because firm-level data miss the reallocation that occurs within plants. 
Similar problems arise due to differences in the definition of ownership changes and mergers and 
acquisitions across countries, which implies that in some countries changes in ownership are 
registered as firm deaths, while in others they are not. Third, existing estimates do not control for 
country differences in the distribution of activity across sectors or the size of firms, which in turn 
affects aggregate turnover rates. Measurement errors increase the standard errors of the estimates 
and may explain the lack of statistically significant association between turnover and EPL.
7 
Fourth, given the limited number of observations, cross-country studies do not properly control 
for a host of country-level variables, such as labor market regulations and institutions, that are 
correlated with EPL and job flows. Lastly, existing estimates are based on a relatively small 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(1996) show a negative association between EPL and job reallocation but do not report whether such an association 
is statistically significant at conventional levels.  
5 OECD, 1999; Garibaldi, Konings and Pissarides (1996); Gómez-Salvador, Messina and Vallanti (2003). 
6 An exception is Caballero, Cowan, Engel and Micco (2004).  
7 One of the few studies that use homogeneous data and controls for sector distribution as well as for the 
characteristics of firms is Gómez-Salvador, Messina and Vallanti (2003).  
  6sample of industrial countries. Inferences based on these results cannot necessarily be 
generalized to other parts of the world.   
In this paper, we develop a formal test of the causal relationship between labor market 
regulations and job turnover that overcomes these difficulties. Following Rajan and Zingales 
(1998), this test exploits differences across sectors to implement a differences-in-differences 
methodology.
8 In the context of a simple dynamic labor demand framework, we show that 
different industries require different levels of employment reallocation.  Such differences arise 
from disparities in the variance of idiosyncratic or sector-wide shocks, as well as technological 
differences. For example, industries with volatile product markets require frequent and sizable 
adjustments in factors, while other industries characterized by stable product markets will require 
small adjustments in labor and capital. In this setup regulations are more binding in industries 
that require more flexibility. 
To identify an industry’s intrinsic demand for adjustment we first study the correlation of 
industry job flows across countries and find that this is very large; across countries, some 
industries tend to exhibit higher levels of job reallocation. This suggests that there are important 
technological or product market characteristics that determine the volatility of a sector.  Given 
this large cross-country correlation, we can safely identify the intrinsic relative employment 
volatility of an industry by the level of job reallocation of that industry in any given country. Our 
baseline country is the United States, which according to many measures has the least restrictive 
employment protection regulation in our sample. Therefore, U.S. sector volatility constitutes a 
good proxy of sector volatility in absence of adjustment costs. In fact, our approach only requires 
the weaker assumption that the U.S. sector ranking is not affected by employment regulations. In 
addition, our results are robust to other baseline choices. The second step consists of identifying 
whether industries that require higher levels of reallocation are relatively less volatile in 
countries with more stringent job regulations.   
To implement these tests, we construct a sample of average annual job reallocation rates 
by industry and country for a sample of developed and developing countries. We complement 
this data with some newly available measures of the regulatory environment.  Since these are de 
jure measures, which compare labor laws according to what is written in the labor codes, we also 
                                                           
8 Differences-in-differences methodologies exploiting sector differences have been applied in the corporate 
literature. See Claessens and Laeven (2003), Galindo, Micco and Ordoñez  (2001), Galindo and Micco (2004), and 
Raddatz (2002).  
  7control for differences in the level of enforcement of labor laws. The results indicate that 
employment protection reduces job flows, and that this is particularly the case in industries that 
require a higher level of reallocation. We find that these effects occur both within the sample of 
developed and developing countries. There is weak evidence that this effect is larger in countries 
with better law enforcement (proxied by rule of law measures). This result may be driven by our 
focus on the manufacturing sector, which tends to exhibit higher rates of compliance with 
regulations than other sectors of activity.  
Our results are robust to changes in the way we measure labor market regulations and 
sector flexibility requirements. They are also robust to the inclusion of firm entry and exit 
regulations and additional controls to account for differences in sector volatility across countries. 
Lastly, they are also robust to changes in the sample of countries or sectors used in our study.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates and describes the 
empirical framework. Section 3 presents the data used as well as the methodology to identify 
sectors in which regulations are more binding. Section 4 describes our results using both simple 
cross-country regressions and our differences-in-differences approach. The section also describes 
the results when controlling for firm entry and exit regulations as well as the results of 
performing a battery of robustness tests.  Finally, Section 5 concludes.   
 
2. On the Relationship Between Job Security and Job Reallocation:  
    A Simple Theoretical Framework and Empirical Specification  
 
Our empirical work is based on the notion that some industries require more flexibility than 
others in adjusting their employment levels. Firms in industries that face high volatility in their 
product demand or in their technologies are likely to require more flexibility than firms in more 
stable sectors. In the textile sector, for example, the swings of fashion imply that demand for a 
certain product or material is high one year and low the next. Therefore, regulations that impede 
adjustment are expected to be more binding in sectors that require greater flexibility.  In this 
section we develop a simple dynamic labor demand model to illustrate this idea and to provide 
theoretical support for our empirical specification. 
 
  82.A. A Simple Model 
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where  yijct  denotes the (log) production of firm i in sector j, country c and period t, pijct  is the 
(log) price of such a firm, dijct is a demand shifter and p..ct is the aggregate (log) price in country c 
and period t. In addition, aijct represent a productivity parameter and α denotes the output-labor 
elasticity. Both aijct and dijct are i.i.d random walks (RW). Assuming that there is free mobility of 
labor across sectors and that firms take the national wage (which is also a RW) as given, the log-
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where l*ijct is the desired level of (log) employment of firm i in sector j, country c and period t, if 
there were not adjustment costs and w..ct  is the country level wage.
9 
Defining the aggregate demand, productivity and real wage shocks as the simple average 
of firm and sector specific shocks at the country level,
10 equation (1) becomes  
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where IDSijct denotes the idiosyncratic (firm and sector) demand and supply shocks, and AGS..ct 
denotes the same aggregate shocks minus the change in real wage.
11 In addition, assume a 
                                                           
9  Henceforth wages are assumed to be the numeraire.  
10 The aggregate demand shock is defined as   ∑ ∆ = ∆
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where lijct  denotes the (log) observed level of employment and λc is the adjustment cost in 
country c. 
Using recursively equation (3) and applying the variance operator to the first difference 
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where represents the variance of firms’ employment growth rate within sector j.   ) var( jc l ∆
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The former expression implies that the variance of employment in a given sector will 
depend on (i) the stringency of the regulatory measures (summarized in  c ξ ); (ii) the variance of 
idiosyncratic (firm and sector) shocks (Var(IDSjc)); (iii) the variance of aggregate country shocks 
(Var(AGS.c)) and (iv) the labor share (αγ).
13 
Assuming that the variance of idiosyncratic (firm and sector) shocks is equal across 
countries up to a constant term, var(∆ljc) can be written as: 
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The previous equation implies that an increase in job security (a decline in  jc ξ ), reduces job 
flows.  Subtracting the average variance within a country on both sides of equation (6) yields  
 
                                                           
12 This result assumes a Random Walk without trend but it is easily extended to the case of a Random Walk with 
trend. 












= ∆ − ∆ 2 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 (






l l    (7) 
 
where  ) var( jc l ∆  is the country average.  
Equation (7) implies that the difference in employment reallocation between a volatile 
sector and the economy average is lower the more stringent are labor regulations. This is the 
inference that we test in our empirical analysis.  Thus, the previous equation is a differences-in-
differences equation that could be estimated using country fixed effects. In the next section, we 




2.B. Empirical Specification  
 
Following the empirical literature on differences in differences, our empirical approach exploits 
sector differences to determine whether sectors that require more adjustment flexibility are more 
affected by stringent employment protection laws than sectors that require less flexibility. This 
approach allows us to use country fixed effects to control for all observable and unobservable 
country characteristics. In particular, it allows us to control for differences in country and sector 
output volatility as well as for differences in the coverage and methodology of data collection 
across countries. This approach also alleviates the potential problem of endogeneity of 
regulations present in cross-country analysis. Thus, by using sector-level data and controlling for 
country-wide volatility with country fixed effects we account for the feedback from labor 
turnover to regulations. 
In our empirical exercise we estimate two types of specifications. Following the previous 
literature, the first one is simply a cross-section regression, controlling for industry fixed effects. 
That is 
 
                                                (8)  jc c c j jc Z R S ε β α τ + + + =
 
where Sjc indicates employment reallocation in sector j in country c (our measure of employment 
volatility), τj is an industry fixed effect, Rc is a measure of employment protection regulations 
that vary across countries and Zc is a vector of controls at the country level. Results based on 
estimating expression (8) improve upon existing estimates because they account for differences 
  11in sector composition across countries. However, there are still a host of variables, such as 
differences in wage bargaining institutions and other labor market regulations contained in the 
error term, which can be correlated with employment protection regulations. We may also face a 
severe endogeneity problem as countries with higher employment volatility may mandate higher 
levels of job security to reduce the uncertainty faced by employees. Moreover, differences in the 
measure of turnover across countries reduce the precision of the estimates. Therefore, we also 
implement a differences-in-differences estimation based on equations (6) and (7) in the previous 
section. That is, we examine whether the difference in sector reallocation between sectors that 
require more employment flexibility and other sectors is lower in highly regulated countries.  
However, since the reality is more complex than our simple model, we also control for sector 
fixed effects and the effect of other variables that may affect differences in sector turnover across 
countries.  That is, we estimate the following expression:  
 
          (9)  jc jc j c c j jc Z X R S ε δ δ τ τ + + + + = 1 0
 
where τj and τc are sector and country fixed-effects,  Xj is a variable that measures the flexibility 
requirements of sector j and Zjc. is a vector of controls that vary at the country-sector level.  Note 
that in our theoretical model,  that is, the flexibility requirements of each 
sector are given by their intrinsic volatility; sectors that due to the nature of their demand or 
technological shocks are more volatile will need more frequent adjustments and will be more 
constrained by stringent employment protection regulations. Therefore, the model predicts a 
negative coefficient on the interaction term between a sector’s intrinsic volatility and 
employment protection regulations   
2 ) 1 /( αγ − = j j VAR X
Our simple theoretical model also provides guidance on how to identify Xj. Under the 
assumption that sector intrinsic employment volatility is equal across countries up to a constant 
term, and making use of the fact that regulatory costs are very low in the United States, we can 
take the adjustment costs in this country as the numeraire—or  1
~
= USA λ
1 /( − j
 in equation (6)—and use 
U.S. sector job reallocation as a proxy for the difference in intrinsic variance of employment 
across sectors in the absence of adjustment costs—or VAR  in equation (6).
14  
2 ) αγ
                                                           
14 While in recent years most US courts have adopted wrongful discharge doctrines, the United States still ranks 
very low in terms of mandatory dismissal costs in international terms. For several of the regulatory measures that we 
use in this paper, the US displays the lowest costs of regulations in the OECD sample. Taking the Heckman and 
  12Obviously, for this proxy to be appropriate, the correlation between sector job flows between the 
US and in other countries should be high. That is, more stringent regulation should reduce the 
difference in job reallocation across sectors but not affect the sector ranking. In the next section, 
we describe our data and show that this is indeed the case.  
 
3. Data and Correlations  
 
3.A. Data   
 
Following Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), job reallocation is defined as the sum of job creation 
and job destruction. The data used in this paper cover sector information at the two-digit level on 
manufacturing industries for 18 countries, 11 developed and 7 in the developing world, during 
the 1980s and 1990s (see Table 1 for a summary and Table A.3 for a full description of the job 
reallocation data). Plant-level data have been used for most countries, except for Argentina, Italy 
and the United Kingdom, where only firm-level information was available. Entry and exit data 
were available for all countries but Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela.
15  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
We also collect excess reallocation data for the few countries in which this measure is 
available. Excess reallocation data is defined as the difference between job reallocation and net 
job creation.
16  In the absence of heterogeneous job creation and destruction patterns across firms 
within sectors, excess job reallocation would be zero. Instead, excess reallocation measures tend 
to be quite large, indicating that a large share of job reallocation is not driven by aggregate 
shocks (more than 70 percent of job reallocation in our sample is driven by idiosyncratic shocks). 
In addition, there is a high correlation between sector job reallocation and sector excess job 
reallocation (0.99).  
   Brazil and New Zealand stand out as the countries with the highest reallocation rates, 
while Norway and Germany are the countries with the lowest rates among the sample of 
countries in which firm entry and exit data are available (see Table 1). Job reallocation is 20.8 
percent in the overall sample (see Table 2.1). On average, job reallocation is very similar in 
OECD countries (21.14) and in Latin America (20.42). However, this is partly due to the lack of 
 
1 = USA
Pagés (2003) Job Security index for the USA at face value the adjustment costs in the US are zero and therefore 
ζ . 
15 See Appendix A for a further description of the sources and data characteristics for this variable and all the other 
variables used in the empirical analysis. 
16 See Davis and Haltiwanger (1999).  
  13entry and exit data for some Latin American countries. The average reallocation for all Latin 
American countries with entry and exit data is 26.37. Cross-country comparisons, however, 
should be treated cautiously. Besides the treatment of entry and exit, differences in the collection 
and nature of the data, differences in the definition and treatment of firm mergers, and 
differences in the size of shocks imply that the data are not strictly comparable. This is a standard 
problem in cross-country exercises, which we will be able to avoid using a differences-in-
differences methodology to compare countries.  
To characterize job security across countries we principally use two alternative measures. 
The first measure is constructed by Botero, Djankov, La Porta et al. (2003) for 85 countries 
worldwide. This measurement, taken in 1997, is the sum of four variables, each of which takes 
on values between 0 and 1: (i) grounds of dismissal, (ii) dismissal procedures, (iii) notice and 
severance payments and (iv) protection of employment in the constitution. The rules of grounds 
of dismissal range from allowing the employment relationship to be terminated at will, by any 
party at any time, to allowing termination only on the basis of a very narrow list of “fair” causes. 
Procedures for dismissal require employers to obtain authorization for third parties (unions, 
judges, etc.) prior to dismissal. Advance notice and severance payments are measured for a 
worker with a 20-year tenure at a firm.  
The second measure of job security is constructed by Heckman and Pagés (2003), 
subsequently referred to as HP, and is narrower in scope, only including provisions that have a 
direct impact on the monetary cost of dismissing a worker. This measure, however, has the 
advantage of varying across time, thus better reflecting the regulatory environment during the 
early years of our sample than the previous measure. It also has the advantage of better reflecting 
the varying schedule of advance notice and severance pay at different tenure levels. To quantify 
the effects of the legislation according to advance notice and severance pay, the authors construct 
a measure that computes the expected future firing costs, discounted at the time a worker is 
hired, assuming a constant probability of dismissal and discount rate across countries. The 
resulting cost is measured in multiples of monthly wages.  
For robustness, we also use a third measure of employment regulation, the EPL index 
constructed by OECD (1999). Although this measure is only available for OECD countries, 
earlier versions of the EPL index have been widely used in the employment protection 
  14literature.
17 This index is computed as a unweighted average of two indices that reflect the level 
of employment protection for regular, permanent workers and the stringency of the regulation of 
temporary work both in the early and in the late 1990s.
18 The higher the EPL index, the more 
restrictive the regulations.  
Table 2.1 indicates that the measures of job security are higher on average for Latin 
America than for the OECD sample and that the differences are quite substantial. For instance, 
according to the HP measure the direct expected cost of dismissal in Latin America is greater 
than 3 months of pay, while in the OECD sample, payments amount to only 1.52 months of pay.  
The Botero, Djankov, La Porta et al. (2003) measure also reflects a cost that is much higher in 
the Latin America sample than in the OECD. The correlation between the Botero, Djankov, La 
Porta et al. (2003) and the Heckman and Pagés (2003) measures of job security is positive and 
statistically significant (0.59), as shown in Table 2.2. The correlation between the Botero, 
Djankov, La Porta et al. (2003) measure and the OECD constructed EPL index is 0.66. 
It can be argued, however, that the stringency of the regulatory environment depends on 
the level of enforcement of the law. While direct measures of the degree of enforceability of 
labor laws do not exist, it is expected that countries with better overall rule of law and more 
effective governments are more likely to enforce labor laws.  We use the simple time average of 
the rule of law and government effectiveness measures constructed by Kauffman, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2003) to account for law enforceability differences across countries. These indicators 
reflect the responses given by a large number of enterprise, citizens and expert survey 
respondents across the world. The values of these measures are standardized between –2 and 2. 
Higher values reflect better rule of law and higher government effectiveness. Table 2.1 reflects 
that both measures are higher in the OECD than in the Latin American sample.    
 
3.B. Ranking Sectors According to Flexibility Requirements 
 
In this subsection we provide evidence that there are indeed important differences across sectors 
in the volatility of employment and that these differences are highly correlated across the 
countries in our sample.  
                                                           
17 See, for instance, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000); Nickell (1997); Nickell and Layard (1999); Garibaldi and Mauro 
(2002) and Gómez-Salvador, Messina and Vallanti (2003). 
18See Annex 2.B of OECD (1999). 
  15Table 3 shows the correlations of two-digit ISIC sector average job reallocation across 
pairs of countries. It also shows the correlation in job reallocation between each country and the 
simple average of job reallocation in Anglo-Saxon countries (row 19) as well as with the simple 
average in our sample (row 20). It is quite remarkable that the correlation across countries is very 
high. For instance, the pair-wise correlation between Argentina and Brazil is 0.87, and it is 
significant at the 1 percent level  (second row, first column). This high correlation indicates that 
volatile sectors in Argentina tend to be the same as in Brazil. Moreover, the correlation between 
the sector reallocation in Argentina and all other countries of the sample, with the exception of 
Finland, Sweden and Venezuela, is also very high and statistically significant at conventional 
levels.  As Table 3 shows, this is the case for most pairs of countries in our sample, even between 
countries that are far from one another in terms of either economic development or geographic 
distance. Focusing on the correlations with the U.S. (row 17), the pair-wise correlations with 
developing and developed countries are positive in 16 out of 17 cases, and statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level in 12 countries. The correlations between the U.S. and the 
other three Anglo-Saxon countries in our sample (Canada, the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand), all highly deregulated countries, is 0.85 or higher.  The two countries with the lowest 
pair-wise correlation with the U.S., and in general with most countries, are France and Sweden. 
The large correlation among countries in sector job reallocation is not exclusively the 
product of common sector shocks. In fact, as shown in Table B.1 in Appendix B, the correlation 
in sector excess job reallocation across countries is positive, large, and in most cases statistically 
significant. This implies that some sectors experience a higher variance of firm or plant-specific 
shocks than others and that these sector characteristics are correlated across countries.   
In sum, our previous results show that some industries are more volatile than others, and 
that these sectors tend to be the same across countries. This high correlation is due to common 
sector shocks and also to important commonalities in the distribution of plant or firm-
idiosyncratic shocks. From these results we can conclude that some industries require greater 
input flexibility. In the next section, we show the results of using these sector characteristics to 
implement a differences-in-differences estimation.  
 
  164. Results  
 
4.A. Cross-Country Estimates 
 
We start our analysis by estimating cross-country regressions as laid out in specification (8). The 
results are summarized in Table 4. As mentioned above, we view these results as a preliminary 
and possibly biased first step. We regress sector job reallocation on the Botero, Djankov, La 
Porta et al. measure of job security, controlling for each country’s GDP volatility and sector 
fixed effects. In addition, we control for differences in survey methodology across countries by 
including two dummy variables. The first takes a value of one if in a given country the data is 
collected at the plant level data and zero if it is collected at the firm level. The second dummy 
takes the value of one if in a given country the survey captures entry and exit of plants and zero 
if it does not.  In addition, since we measure job security regulation but not the rigor with which 
it is enforced, in some specifications we include a proxy for law enforceability and its interaction 
term with job security. Given that most regressors only vary across countries, we compute the 
standard errors allowing for within-country clustering in the error terms. 
   Column one restricts the sample to developed countries, whereas column two uses all 
available countries. In both cases, we observe that the coefficient on job security is negative, 
although not statistically significant at conventional levels. Macro shocks (measured as the 
standard deviation of the GDP growth rate) have a positive effect on reallocation, although this 
effect is only statistically significant in the overall sample, possibly driven by the larger size of 
aggregate shocks in developing countries. The coefficient on the dummy for entry and exit is 
positive and statistically significant, indicating that firm entry and exit explains a sizeable portion 
of labor reallocation. Overall, these results are consistent with those found by OECD (1999)— 
that is, at conventional levels of significance, higher levels of job security do not appear to 
reduce turnover. Finally, the coefficient on the plant dummy is negative and statistically 
significant in some of the specifications. 
In the next two columns, we re-estimate the baseline specification once we include a 
control for rule of law as a proxy of law enforcement. The coefficient on job security remains 
negative, and it becomes larger (in absolute value), especially for the sample that includes less 
developed countries. Nonetheless, it remains statistically insignificant at conventional levels. 
Column (5) presents the results of re-estimating the former specification with a dataset that 
includes alternative sources of data for Brazil and Mexico. Instead of data obtained from social 
  17security registries, we use data from a manufacturing census survey, which only collects 
information on continuing plants.  In this sample, the coefficient on job security regulations is 
negative and statistically significant at conventional levels.  Overall, these results suggest that the 
effect of job security provisions on job turnover is negative, but estimated with a large standard 
error.  
In Columns (6)-(8), we present the results of estimating specification (8), adding an 
interaction term between rule of law and the job security regulations measure. A negative 
coefficient on this variable indicates that the negative effect of job security regulations on 
turnover is larger (in absolute value) the better is the rule of law in a given country.  The results 
are again ambiguous. In the sample of developed countries, the interaction term between job 
security and rule of law is negative and statistically significant at conventional levels. However, 
in the overall sample of countries, this coefficient is lower (in absolute value) and not statistically 
significant regardless of the source of data for Brazil and Mexico.   
We also experimented with government effectiveness as an alternative control for labor 
law enforceability, and the results are identical. Controlling for this variable yields an interaction 
coefficient that is negative but statistically significant only in the sample of developed countries.  
Table B.2 in Appendix B presents the results of performing the same exercise for two 
alternative measures of job security: Heckman and Pagés (2003) and the OECD indices of Job 
Security. Results with the HP measure are more ambiguous than those obtained with the Botero, 
Djankov, La Porta et al. (2003) measure. For instance, in a regression controlling for GDP 
growth volatility and survey dummies, the coefficient on job security yields coefficients that are 
positive but statistically not different from zero. Similarly, controlling for rule of law yields 
coefficients on job security that are negative but statistically not different from zero. In addition, 
the coefficient on the interaction between rule of law and job security is negative but it is not 
statistically significant. The OECD 1990 measure, EPL90, yields results that are similar to those 
obtained with the Botero, Djankov, La Porta et al. (2003) measure for OECD countries, while the 
1980 measure is not statistically correlated with turnover, even when controlling for rule of law. 
Summarizing, Table 4 (and Table B.2 in Appendix B) presents evidence that job security 
is only weakly associated with lower turnover. Only when controlling for rule of law, in some 
particular sub-samples and with some measures of job security, are these regulations negatively 
associated with turnover. While the results here are somewhat more promising than those found 
  18in the previous literature, they do not appear as sufficiently robust. However, simple cross-
country estimates may be severely biased due to endogeneity or omitted variable problems. In 
addition, despite the relatively large number of observations, the identification comes from 
regulatory differences across 18 countries. The next subsection presents the results of 
implementing the differences-in- differences methodology described above, which allows us to 
circumvent these problems. We show below that the results change substantially once such 
country effects are properly controlled for.  
 
4.B. Differences-in-Differences Estimation 
 
The main advantage of this procedure is that by focusing on the differential effect across sectors 
within countries, we can now control for all observable and unobservable country characteristics, 
greatly reducing the scope for omitted variables. We can also account for endogeneity, since we 
control for a country’s propensity to implement more restrictive regulations with country fixed 
effects and focus on differences across sectors using U.S. sector employment reallocation as a 
proxy for a sector intrinsic sector flexibility requirements. The second advantage is that this 
procedure relies on the differences across sectors in countries with different levels of regulation, 
thus multiplying the sources of variation used to estimate this equation.  
Table 5 shows the results of estimating specification (9). The main result of this paper is 
presented in column (1). After controlling for country and sector fixed effects, we find that more 
intrinsically volatile industries present lower levels of job turnover, relative to less volatile 
sectors, in countries with more stringent employment protection laws. The sign of the coefficient 
on the interaction terms is negative and significant.  The row labeled differential in job 
reallocation at the bottom of the table shows the magnitude of the impact of job security on job 
turnover differentials across sectors and countries, according to our estimation.  For example, in 
column (1) this differential is 5.8 percent. This number should be interpreted as follows: job 
reallocation in an industry in the 90
th percentile of flexibility requirement relative to an industry 
in the 10
th percentile is 5.8 percentage points lower in a country with strict employment 
protection (that is, in the 90
th percentile of job security) than in a country with low employment 
protection (in the 10
th percentile). These are large numbers if we consider that the average level 
of job turnover in our sample is 22 percent. 
  19It could be argued that these results are driven by differences in sector volatility across 
countries with different levels of income per capita, which in turn are correlated with differences 
in regulatory levels.
19 To control for such possible income effects, we add to the regression the 
interaction between income per capita and U.S. job reallocation.  Controlling for such effects 
yields a larger coefficient and a larger magnitude of the impact of jobs security on turnover. In 
column (2), an increase in job security from the 10 to the 90 (80 to 20) percentile reduces job 
reallocation by 9.7 (7.3) percentage points.  The coefficient on the income and flexibility 
requirement interaction is also negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level, 
suggesting that job reallocation in more volatile sectors is relatively higher in less developed 
countries. Figure 1 shows the scatter plot of job reallocation against the interaction of U.S. job 
reallocation and job security once country fixed effects, sector fixed effects, and income levels 
are taken into account (regression reported in column (2), Table 5). The graph shows a clear 
negative relation between these two variables.  
These results are robust to alternative classifications of sector flexibility requirements.  In 
column (3) we measure sector flexibility requirements according to average sector job 
reallocation in the sample of Anglo-Saxon countries. While the coefficient in the interaction term 
is smaller, the magnitude of the impact of regulations on sector reallocation becomes slightly 
larger.
20 In column (4) we measure sector-specific flexibility requirements with U.S. excess 
reallocation. Using excess reallocation allows us to focus only on plant or firm-idiosyncratic 
shocks. The results are qualitatively unchanged.  Measuring sector flexibility requirements 
according to the ranking of U.S. sector reallocation and computing job reallocation differences 
across sectors in percentage rates (ln SUM) rather than in percentage points does not alter the 
results  (columns (5) and (6)). The magnitude of the effect in column (5) is comparable to the 
one estimated in column (1), that is, increasing job security from the 10 to the 90 percentile 
reduces turnover in volatile sectors relative to non-volatile sectors by 28 percent.    
In columns (7) to (9) we assess the robustness of our results to alternative measures of 
regulations. Measuring the stringency of job security with the HP measure yields a coefficient on 
job security that is negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The coefficient on 
                                                           
19 Heckman and Pagés (2003) and Botero, Djankov, La Porta et al. (2003) show that, across countries, the stringency 
of job security regulations decreases with income levels. 
20 This result comes from the fact that sector job reallocation varies more within Anglo-Saxon countries than within 
the U.S. 
  20the income and flexibility requirement interaction is also negative and statistically significant. 
The coefficient on the job security interaction is also negative and statistically significant at 5 
percent when we use the OECD-formulated measures of employment protection. These results 
indicate that employment protection regulations reduce turnover regardless of the regulatory 
measure considered. 
Finally, columns (10) and (11) show that the previous results do not depend on whether 
we use the manufacturing census data or the social security registry data for Brazil and Mexico. 
However, the coefficient on job security and the estimated magnitude of the effect on turnover is 
larger if manufacturing census data are used.   
In sum, the results in Table 5 suggest that using a differences-in-differences methodology 
that controls for country, sector and income effects allows us to identify a large and negative 
effect of job security on turnover. 
We next assess whether these results hold within the samples of developed and 
developing countries. The results are reported in Table 6.  Columns (1) – (3) examine our main 
difference-in-difference estimation in the Latin American (LAC) and the developed country 
(DEV) samples.  The coefficient is negative and statistically significant in the sample of 
developed countries and statistically different from zero in the LAC sample when we use the 
manufacturing census data for Mexico and Brazil. The results are very similar if we measure 
sector flexibility requirements with U.S. excess job reallocation. Finally, the last three columns 
present the results once we control for law enforceability. We also include the interaction effect 
between job security and rule of law to determine whether job security regulations are more 
effective in countries with better rule of law.  The results provide weak evidence for this 
hypothesis. The coefficients on the triple interaction are negative but not statistically significant 
at conventional levels. However, rule of law may be a poor proxy for labor law enforcement. 
Alternatively, this result may be driven by our focus on the manufacturing sector, which exhibits 
higher levels of compliance than other sectors.     
 
4.C. Regulations on Entry and Exit of Firms versus Employment Protection Regulations 
 
The entry and exit of firms explains a large share of total labor reallocation (Davis, Haltiwanger 
and Schuh, 1996).  Therefore, regulations that increase the cost of entry and exit of firms can 
also dampen labor reallocation. Since it is quite plausible that across countries, the political 
  21economy that leads to the enactment of job security regulations also leads to the enactment of 
regulations on entry and exit, our formerly estimated coefficients may be capturing the effects of 
entry and exit regulations rather than, or in addition to, the effects of job security. To assess 
whether this is the case, we control for measures of the cost of entry and the cost of bankruptcy.
21  
These are the following: 
   Cost of entry: We use two alternative measures constructed by Djankov, La 
Porta, López-de-Silanes et al. (2002). The first measure is the minimum time 
required to complete all the procedures to start a firm (measured in years). The 
second is the minimum number of procedures that are required to open a firm.  
   Bankruptcy costs: We use three alternative measures constructed by Djankov, 
Hart, Nenova et al. (2003). The first is the average duration that bankruptcy 
lawyers estimate is necessary to complete a bankruptcy process (in years). The 
second is the cost of the entire bankruptcy process, including court costs, 
bankruptcy attorneys’ costs, and the cost of independent assessors, lawyers 
and accountants, as a proportion of the bankrupt estate.
22 The third measure, 
named absolute priority, documents the order in which claims are paid in the 
insolvency process, including payment of post-petition claims.  A higher value 
of this measure indicate that creditors claims are given first priority over the 
claims of workers, tax collectors or shareholders.  
 
We aggregate the cost of entry and exit measures to create two measures, which we name 
CEE1 and CEE2. The first, CEE1, is the average of the time cost (in years) of creating and 
closing a firm. To construct CEE2 we standardize between zero and one the number of 
procedures to open a firm as well as the cost of bankruptcy as a percentage of the insolvent 
estate. We then take the simple average of the two standardized measures.  
Table 7 shows the correlations between job security and the cost of entry and exit 
measures. All correlations are statistically significant at 10 percent. Countries where the cost of 
firm entry and exit is low tend to give priority to creditors in the insolvency process. 
Interestingly, there is also a strong negative correlation between Absolute Priority and the job 
                                                           
21 These measures are available online. The address is http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness/default.aspx 
22 The cost of bribes is not included in this measure. 
  22security measures. This suggests that the enactment of strict job security provisions is associated 
with giving lower priority to creditors and higher priority to workers’ claims in the bankruptcy 
process. Within our sample Canada, Germany, Finland, the United Kingdom, Norway, New 
Zealand, Sweden, Uruguay, the United States and Venezuela give first priority to creditors. The 
rest give higher priority to other claims.  The correlation between job security provisions and 
CEE1 and CEE2 is also positive and statistically significant at conventional levels.  
Table 8 shows the results of estimating our baseline specification once we control for 
entry and exit regulations. Including CEE1, CEE2 or Absolute Priority interacted with sector 
flexibility requirements does not alter our baseline results.  The coefficient on the interaction 
between U.S. reallocation and the job security measure does not vary much and remains 
statistically significant at 1 percent. The coefficients on the cost of entry and exit measures and 
on the priority measure are negative but not statistically significant.   
We next investigate whether stringent regulations on firm entry and exit are more likely 
to reduce turnover in those sectors that experience higher labor reallocation due to entry and exit 
of firms. We measure a sector’s intrinsic birth and death propensity with U.S. data on labor 
reallocation caused by firm’ births and deaths by sector. Our results suggest that entry and exit 
regulations play a smaller role in affecting sector differences in turnover than job security 
regulations.   
Finally, we investigate whether firm entry and exit regulations increase the effect of job 
security provisions on turnover. This is the case if employers can evade labor regulations by 
declaring bankruptcy, laying off workers without paying workers’ claims, and opening another 
firm shortly afterwards. There is no evidence that firms engage in such practices to avoid 
incurring the costs associated with labor laws. Yet, to a large extent this is due to the lack of 
relevant variation given the high correlation across regulations. In two out of three cases, the 
coefficient on the interaction of U.S. sector reallocation and job security is still statistically 
significant, while the triple interaction is not. In the case of the absolute priority measure, both 
the main effect and the triple interaction become statistically insignificant. Yet, both coefficients 
are jointly significant. The large correlation between job security and absolute priority measures 
does not allow us to identify these coefficients separately. 
In sum, although regulations on entry and exit of firms and job security regulations are 
correlated, our main results are not driven by such a correlation. In addition, there is little 
  23evidence that entry and exit regulations affect turnover either directly, or indirectly by increasing 
the effect of job security provisions. 
 
4.D. Robustness to Sample Changes 
 
It is well known that cross-country regressions suffer from lack of robustness.  In this paper we 
are able to control for a host of observable and unobservable country and sector effects using a 
difference-in-difference methodology.  Our main results are robust to changes in regulatory 
measures, measurement of sector flexibility requirements, control variables and use of different 
sub-samples. However, it could still be the case that the results are driven by the inclusion or 
exclusion of a given country or sector.  To test for this possibility, we re-run our baseline 
estimates (columns (2) and (6) in Table 5) excluding one country and one sector at a time.  
Table 9 reports the results of re-estimating our baseline results excluding one country at a 
time. The results are very robust. In all cases, the coefficient on the interaction term is negative 
and statistically significant at the one percent level.  Excluding Mexico and Uruguay, a very 
small country where average job reallocation is computed with lower precision, increases the 
size of the estimates.
23 Similarly, Table 10 indicates that our main results do not depend on the 
inclusion of a given sector of activity.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has shown that some sectors exhibit greater volatility than others and that these 
differences are strongly correlated across countries.  We develop a simple empirical framework 
to show how differences in the variance of idiosyncratic or sector specific shocks leads to 
differences in the intrinsic demand for factor adjustment across sectors. The model also predicts 
that sectors that require more flexibility should be relatively more affected by stringent job 
security regulations than sectors that require less flexibility. Using sector job reallocation data for 
18 countries, we implement an econometric test of this hypothesis using a differences-in-
differences estimation. Our results suggest that strict job security regulations slow down job 
reallocation and that these effects are larger in sectors with a higher demand for adjustment. 
Moreover, the magnitude of these effects is large. We also investigate whether entry and exit 
                                                           
23 Ideally one should weight the estimates by each sector standard deviation in job reallocation. However these data 
were only available for the Latin American sample. 
  24regulations can be partly responsible for the effects we attribute to job security regulations. 
However, we find little evidence for this hypothesis. In addition, once we control for job 
security, the effect of entry and exit regulations on gross job flows is not statistically significant 
at conventional levels.   
Our results suggest that if productivity gains resulting from job reallocation are 
important, constraints on dismissals may reduce an economy’s productive efficiency by a 
substantial amount, unless such losses are compensated by productivity gains derived from more 
stable employment relationships. They also suggest that job security regulations will affect some 
countries more than others depending on their industry mix; countries whose comparative 
advantage is in volatile industries will be more affected by the enactment of stringent job 
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  29Appendix A. Data Description 
 
 
Table A.1.  Definitions and Sources of Variables 
 
Variable   Description                
SUM   Job Reallocation. This variable is defined as the sum of job creation and job destruction.  We construct a sector-country data set 
computing the time average of the annual measures. The data comes from several sources. In some cases, like in Chile, Mexico, 
Brazil and Venezuela, we compute the reallocation measures based on industrial surveys. For the other countries, we use data 
available from published articles to build a sector-country data set. See Table A2 for a complete description of sources for each 
country. The data set covers industries in the manufacturing sector defined according to the 2-digit ISIC Rev.2 classification. The 
periods covered, the unit of observation (whether plant or firm) and the treatment of entry and exit differ across countries (see Table 
A.2). 
Excess SUM  Excess Reallocation. This variable is defined as job reallocation minus the absolute value of net job creation.  As with job 
reallocation, we compute the time average of the annual measures. The sources are the same than the ones listed in Table A.2 
although there are less country-sector observations available for this variable.  
Index USA SUM  Ranking of Reallocation. This variable is the ranking of average employment volatility across U.S. sectors during the period 1973-
1993 
Job Security Bot.  Job Security. This variable measures the protection of the rules governing the termination of the employment contract as the 
average of  (i) protection of grounds of dismissal;  (ii) protection of dismissal procedures; (iii) notice and severance payment; and 
(iv) right to job security in the constitution. It ranges from zero to one. Higher values of this measure indicate more stringent job 
security regulations. Source:  Botero, Djankov, La Porta et al. (2003).  
Job security HP  Job Security. This variable measures the stringency of job security regulations according to the expected value of the payments to a 
worker to abide by mandatory advance notice and severance pay regulations.  The source is Heckman and Pagés (2003) and is the 
sum  of their variables advance notice and Indemnities for dismissal. In the cases that this index exhibits time variation, we compute 
the time average for the periods listed in Table A.2 It is measured in multiples of monthly wages. 
EPL_80                  
EPL_90 
Job Security. These variables measure the stringency of job security regulations, at the end of the eighties and at of the nineties 
according to the unweighted average of two indices measuring (i) the strictness of regular contracts and (ii) the regulation of 
temporary contracts, respectively. In turn, the index of regular contracts is the average of the procedural inconveniences, the notice 
and severance pay and the difficulty of dismissal. The index of temporary contracts reflects the difficulties to hire with fixed term 
contracts and the restrictions on temporary work agencies.  Higher values of the EPL indices reflect more stringent regulations. 
Source: OECD (1999)  
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Variable   Description                
R. of Law  Rule of Law. This measure captures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society.  It includes 
perceptions of incidence of crime, effectiveness and predictability of judiciary and the enforceability of contracts. These components are 
aggregated using an unobserved components model.  Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Matruzzi (2003). For our estimates, we compute the 
time average of the original measure. 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Government Effectiveness. This measure captures the ability of the government to formulate and implement policy. It combines 
measures of the competence of the civil servants, the independence of the civil service and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to policies. These components are aggregated using an unobserved components model.  Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2003). For our estimates, we compute the time average of the original measure. 
CEE1  Cost of Entry and Exit. Is the unweighted average of the time cost (in years) of creating and closing a firm. The source for the cost of 
entry is Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes et al. (2002); the source for the cost of bankruptcy is Djankov, Hart, Nenova et al. (2003). 
CEE2  Cost of Entry and Exit. Constructed as the unweighted average of the cost of entry (measured as number of procedures to create a firm 
and normalized between zero and one) and the cost of bankruptcy (measured as percent of the insolvent estate also normalized between 
zero and one). The source for the cost of entry is Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes et al. (2002), the source for the cost of 
bankruptcy is Djankov, Hart, Nenova et al. (2003).  
Absolute Priority  Order in which claims are paid in insolvency process. Higher value of this measure reflect higher priority given to creditors' claims 
over other claims. Source: Djankov, Hart, Nenova et al. (2003) 
GDPpc     Gross Domestic Product per Capita. Measured in Constant 1995 US $.Source: World Bank Development Indicators  
 
Note: The first column gives the names of the variables as we use them. The second column provides a description of the variables as well as their sources.  
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Table A.2. Job Reallocation Data Sources 
Country  Country  Period  Sectors  Unit  Entry/Exit  Source       
Argentina ARG  1991-2001  9  Firms  No  Butler and Sanchez (2003)     
Brazil BRA  1992-2000 8  Plants  Yes  Menezes-Filho  (2003) 
Brazil BRA  (IS)  1997-2000 9  Firms  No  Authors’  construction  1  
Canada CAN  1979-1988  9  Plants  Yes  Baldwin, Dunne and Haltiwanger (1998)  
Chile CHL  1991-1999  8  Plants  Yes  Bergoeing, Hernando & Repetto (2003)  
Colombia COL  2  1993-1999  9  Plants  Yes  Medina, Meléndez & Seim (2003)  
Germany DEU  1986-1989 9  Plants  Yes  Grey  (1995)   
Finland FIN  1985-1988 9  Plants  Yes  Grey  (1995)   
France FRA  1984-1988 9  Plants  Yes  Gourinchas  (1999)   
United Kingdom  U.K.  1987-1989  9  Firms  Yes  Barnes & Haskel (2002)   
Italy ITA  1987-1989 9  Firms  Yes  Grey  (1995)   
Mexico MEX  1994-2000  9  Plants  Yes  Kaplan, Martínez & Robertson (2003)  
Mexico MEX  (IS)  1994-2000 9  Firms  No  Authors’  construction  3  
Norway  NOR  1984-1986 9  Plants  Yes  Grey  (1995)   
New Zealand  NZL  1986-1989 9  Plants  Yes  Grey  (1995)   
Portugal PRT  1992-1996  9  Plants  Yes  Blanchard and Portugal (2001) 
Sweden SWE  1980-1991 9  Plants  Yes  Grey  (1995)   
Uruguay URY  1988-1995 6  Plants  No  Casacuberta, Fachola & Gandelman (2003)  
United States  U.S.  1973-1993  9  Plants  Yes  Baldwin, Dunne and Haltiwanger (1998)  
Venezuela VEN  1996-1999 9  Plants  No  Authors’  construction  4  
 
Notes: All information is restricted to the manufacturing sector. Industries are defined using 2dig. ISIC rev2 classification.  
   For the case of BRA (IS), CAN, FRA, MEX(IS) and U.K. we use correspondences between national classifications and ISIC rev2. 
   We do not include sectors that on average have fewer than 40 plants. 
   1 BRA uses data from the social security agency (Relação Anual de Informações Sociais),and BRA (IS) from the Manuf. Annual Survey (Pesquisa Industrial Anual). 
   2 Due to methodology changes in 1992, we restrict the data to the period 1993-1999. 
   3 MEX uses data from the social security agency (Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social). MEX (IS) uses data from the Manuf.    Annual Survey (Encuesta Industrial 
INEGI.). 
   4 VEN uses data from the Industrial Survey (Encuesta Industrial  de Venezuela – Instituto de Estadísticas de Venezuela). 
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                                                     Table A.3.  Job Reallocation Data by Sector 
 
Country  /  Sector                      31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
ARG                    15.31 15.47 17.43 12.73 12.91 11.98 12.32 15.36 17.32
BRA                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                 
                   
                   
                   
       
                 
                   
34.40 36.37 36.53 27.69 30.29 29.86 30.32 31.69        
  BRA  (IS)
 
13.77 9.78 10.69 8.57 8.56 8.38 8.56 9.82 7.29
CAN 17.63 26.04 27.70 16.55 18.60 23.00 13.30 25.11 28.10
CHL 28.45 22.79 32.70 21.34 21.77 23.47 9.78 25.45        
  COL 24.86 23.39 29.56 22.71 20.53 19.77 16.01 23.39 22.44
DEU 15.90 15.00 17.50 11.60 8.60 13.00 10.10 12.50 14.60
FIN 14.60 18.90 18.20 19.20 14.70 13.80 10.70 19.60 16.70
FRA 31.24 21.47 28.84 17.27 18.36 14.03 27.41 20.16 28.39
U.K. 22.95 26.19 29.80 22.20 19.96 22.30 20.87 23.87 35.60
ITA 22.40 25.40 23.10 17.40 15.80 17.70 19.10 19.40 38.90
MEX 23.53 35.53 39.57 26.26 22.49 24.90 21.42 26.72 30.82
MEX  (IS)
 
5.95 7.93 9.02 5.46 6.00 6.54 6.07 8.09 6.33
NOR 14.80 17.40 15.70 11.80 12.00 14.30 7.30 18.90 16.30
NZL 27.30 34.30 32.70 23.80 27.40 30.90 25.10 32.30 38.30
PRT 27.09 24.35 27.05 23.31 21.95 22.23 18.06 24.36 26.02
SWE 24.60 21.70 24.60
 
20.70 20.20 26.10 32.60 22.30 19.00
URY 11.91  17.55   10.46 10.91 12.24   15.34         
  U.S. 17.67 21.95 23.58 15.34 17.38 20.24 15.43 19.16 24.02
VEN 9.39 7.61 11.40 7.39 8.67 10.21 4.48 10.06 9.35
Job Reallocation is the sum of job creation and job destruction. We compute the time average by sector for the periods  
described described in Table A.2. See also Table A.2 for data sources.     
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Table B.1. Pair-Wise Correlation for Sector Excess Job Reallocation Between Countries 
 
   ARG  BRA  CHL  COL  GBR  MEX  URY  USA  VEN 
ARG                    1
BRA                 
                 
               
             
           
                 
         
                
      
               
     
           
           
             
0.6400*  1
0.0874  
CHL   0.7542*   0.6607*   1             
0.0306  0.0745  
COL   0.9017*  0.6116   0.8040*   1           
0.0009  0.1072  0.0162  
U.K.  0.7283*  0.6458*   0.8562*  0.7457*   1         
0.0261  0.0837  0.0067  0.0211  
MEX 0.3956 0.6749* 0.5925 0.5537  0.7715* 1
0.2919  0.0663  0.1217  0.122  0.0149  
URY 0.7874* 0.3912 0.5688 0.5376 0.605 0.1176 1
0.063  0.4431  0.2389  0.2713  0.2032  0.8244  
U.S. 0.5941*  0.6758*    0.8034*  0.6367* 0.9260* 0.6662* -0.0003 1
0.0916  0.0658  0.0163  0.0652  0.0003  0.0501  0.9996  
VEN 0.2719  0.254  0.7503*  0.4326  0.2179 0.0245 -0.1786 0.2619 1
0.4791  0.5439  0.032  0.2448  0.5732 0.9501 0.7349 0.496
Anglo Saxon  0.6828*  0.6744*   0.8541*  0.7116* 0.9861* 0.7395* 0.391 0.9759* 0.2414
0.0427  0.0666  0.0069  0.0316 0 0.0228 0.4434 0 0.5315              
Notes: Sector Excess Reallocation is defined as sector job reallocation minus the absolute value of sector net job creation. The first line 
indicates the correlation coefficient and the second the significance level (p-value). * significant at the 10 percent level. All pair-wise 
correlations are estimated with either 8 or 9 observations (depending on whether information is available for sector 39 ISIC Rev2), except for 
Uruguay, where there are only six sectors with more than 40 firms.  Anglo Saxon is the simple average of sector job reallocation for Canada, 
U.K., New Zealand and U.S. 
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                          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
sum sum sum sum sum sum sum sum sum sum sum sum
HP
 
                 
                      
         
         
          
                 
               
                 
                     
                 
              
                
                  
                 
               
               
                   
                
                         
                       
                         
                       
             
                       
 
0.392 0.587 -0.056 -0.176 2.650 -1.357 5.350 -1.262        
(0.942) (0.801) (1.693) (1.060) (5.495) (1.206) (3.619)
 
(1.494)
  Rule Law (RL) 
 


















  Gov.  Effect.  (GE)
 








    EPL_90
 


















GDP  growth  Volat.
 
1.242 1.758 1.587 1.567 1.303 1.048 1.492 1.068 1.567 -1.509 1.088 1.146
(4.619) (0.950)c (4.623) (0.862)c (4.617) (1.085) (4.021) (0.953) (3.376) (2.368) (2.595) (2.758)
Entry/Exit  Dummy
 
0.000 16.825 0.000 17.492 0.000 16.280 0.000 16.514 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (3.568)a (0.000) (3.322)a (0.000) (2.879)a (0.000) (2.719)a (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Plant Dummy 
 
























  Observations 99 157 99 157 99 157 99 157 99 99 90 90
R-squared                         
                         
                         
0.21 0.49 0.22 0.51 0.24 0.53 0.27 0.52 0.31 0.52 0.37 0.37
Sector  FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Dev. ALL Dev. ALL Dev. ALL Dev ALL Dev. Dev. Dev. Dev.
                         
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. HP is the Job Security Index 
developed by Heckman and Pagés (2003). EPL_90 and EPL_80 are the indices of stringency of job security developed by OECD (1999). RL=Rule of Law and 
GE = Government Efficiency, both are institutional variables from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) Entry/Exit is a dummy that indicates whether the 
entry and exit of firms can be observed in the data set. Plant is a dummy for the unit of observation (1 plants, 0 firms)  
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Table 1. Job Reallocation and Institutional Variables 
 




Realloc.  Entry / Exit  Job Sec. Bot. Job Sec. HP  Rule of Law  Gov. Eff. 
Argentina  1991-2001  9                  Firms 14.54 9.61 No 0.44 2.99 -0.84 -0.71
Brazil  1992-2000  8                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
    
Plants 32.14 27.90 Yes 0.69 3.04 -1.22 -1.23
Brazil (IS)  1997-2000  9 Firms 9.49 6.46 No 0.69 3.04 -1.22 -1.23
Canada  1979-1988  9 Plants 21.78 Yes 0.17 0.79 0.86 0.84
Chile  1991-1999  8 Plants 23.22 17.87 Yes 0.31 2.56 0.20 0.18
Colombia  1993-1999  9 Plants 22.52 17.25 Yes 0.62 3.60 -1.65 -1.12
Germany  1986-1989  9 Plants 13.20 Yes 0.50 0.75 0.81 0.70
Finland  1985-1988  9 Plants 16.27 Yes 0.57 1.61 0.99 0.77
France  1984-1988  9 Plants 23.02 Yes 0.31 1.34 0.43 0.45
United Kingdom  1987-1989  9 Firms 24.86 19.14 Yes 0.20 1.44 0.87 1.01
Italy  1987-1989  9 Firms 22.13 Yes 0.24 3.22 -0.11 -0.20
Mexico  1994-2000  9 Plants 27.92 20.13 Yes 0.71 3.16 -1.35 -0.91
Mexico (IS)  1994-2000  9 Firms 6.82 4.95 No 0.71 3.16 -1.35 -0.91
Norway  1984-1986  9 Plants 14.28 Yes 0.30 0.88 1.00 0.75
New Zealand  1986-1989  9 Plants 30.23 Yes 0.04 0.22 0.98 0.72
Portugal  1992-1996  9 Plants 23.83 Yes 0.70 4.48 0.18 0.10
Sweden  1980-1991  9 Plants 23.53 Yes 0.39 1.97 0.89 0.72
Uruguay  1988-1995  6 Plants 13.06 8.59 No 0.03 2.23 -0.51 -0.43
United States  1973-1993  9 Plants 19.42 13.77 Yes 0.08 0.00 0.73 0.68
Venezuela  1996-1999  9 Plants 8.73 5.11 No 0.64 3.94 -1.75 -1.85
Notes: 
Job Reallocation is the sum of Job Creation and Job Destruction. Excess Reallocation is Job Reallocation minus the absolute value    
of the net employment change. Rule of Law and Government Efficiency both are institutional variables from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003).   
Job Sec. Botero is the Job Security Index developed by Botero, Djankov, La Porta et al. (2003). Job Sec. HP is the Job Security Index developed by Heckman and Pagés (2003). 
Brazil (IS) is computed with data from the Manufacturing Annual Survey (Pesquisa Industrial Anual) conducted by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística.  Mexico (IS) is 
obtained from Mexico’s industrial survey: Encuesta Industrial INEGI. 
    
 





               Table 1. Job Reallocation and Institutional Variables (Continuation) 
 
Country Period  EPL_80  EPL_90  Absolute Priority CEE1  CEE2 
Argentina  1991-2001        67  1.49  0.61 
Brazil  1992-2000     33 5.21  0.48 
Canada  1979-1988  0.6 0.6  100  0.40  0.04 
Chile  1991-1999     0 2.94  0.47 
Colombia  1993-1999     33 1.58  0.50 
Germany  1986-1989  3.2 2.5  100  0.66  0.30 
Finland  1985-1988  2.3 2.0  100  0.50  0.06 
France  1984-1988  2.7 3.0  67  1.27  0.47 
United Kingdom  1987-1989  0.5 0.5  100  0.52  0.21 
Italy  1987-1989  4.1 3.3  67  0.68  0.44 
Mexico  1994-2000     33 1.07  0.38 
Norway  1984-1986  3.0 2.6  100  0.48  0.06 
New Zealand  1986-1989    1.0 100 1.00  0.07 
Portugal  1992-1996  4.1 3.7  33  1.43  0.36 
Sweden  1980-1991  3.5 2.2  100  1.02  0.12 
Uruguay  1988-1995     100 2.04  0.33 
United Status  1973-1993  0.2 0.2  100  1.51  0.13 
Venezuela  1996-1999        100  2.16  0.85 
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Table 2.1. Summary Statistics, Whole Sample 
        
 # Observations  Mean  St.Dev.  Min   Max 
Job Reallocation (SUM)  157  20.88  7.42  4.48  39.57 
Excess Reallocation  76  15.56  7.42  1.94  32.32 
Job. Sec. Botero *  18  0.39  0.23  0.03  0.71 
Job. Sec. HP *   18  2.12  1.32  0.00  4.48 
Gov. Effectiveness *  18  1.08  0.87  -0.80  2.07 
Rule of Law *  18  1.09  0.99  -0.69  2.07 
USA SUM*  9  19.27  3.14  15.44  23.44 
         
LAC          
#  Observations  Mean  St.Dev.  Min   Max 
ob Reallocation (SUM)  58  20.42  8.87  4.48  39.57 
Excess Reallocation  58  15.29  8.15  1.94  32.32 
Job. Sec. Botero *  7  0.49  0.25  0.03  0.71 
Job. Sec. HP *  7  3.08  0.58  2.23  3.94 
Gov. Effectiveness *  7  0.18  0.64  -0.80  1.23 
Rule of Law *  7  0.05  0.69  -0.69  1.26 
          
Developed Countries           
# Observations  Mean  St.Dev.  Min   Max 
ob Reallocation (SUM)  99  21.14  6.45  7.3  38.9 
Excess Reallocation  18  16.46  4.38  7.91  25.4 
Job. Sec. Botero *  11  0.32  0.21  0.04  0.70 
Job. Sec. HP *  11  1.52  1.32  0.00  4.48 
Gov. Effectiveness *  11  1.65  0.35  0.85  2.07 
Rule of Law *  11  1.76  0.37  0.95  2.07 





Table 2.2. Correlation Between Job Security Indexes 
 
EPL_80 EPL_90 Job Sec. HP Job Sec. Botero et al.(2003) 
EPL_80  1          
EPL_90 0.9557  1     
Job Sec. HP  0.6919  0.6988  1   
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    ARG  BRA  CAN CHL COL  DEU FIN FRA U.K. ITA MEX  NOR NZL PRT  SWE  URY  U.S.  VEN 
A R G   1                     
BRA  0.8722*  1                   
  0.0047                    
CAN  0.7536*  0.6357*  1                  
  0.019  0.0902                   
CHL  0.7445*  0.5654  0.7015* 1                 
  0.0341  0.1441  0.0525                  
COL  0.7624*  0.6674*  0.5948* 0.9198* 1                
  0.0169  0.0705  0.0912  0.0012                 
DEU  0.7763*  0.8015*  0.6313* 0.7469* 0.7919* 1               
  0.0139  0.0167  0.0683  0.0332  0.011                
FIN  0.5219  0.2718  0.5937* 0.58  0.6862* 0.3941  1              
  0.1495  0.515  0.0919  0.1318  0.0412  0.294               
FRA  0.6388*  0.6126  0.0569  0.1713  0.3335  0.5258  -0.1739 1             
  0.064 0.1064  0.8845 0.685 0.3805 0.146 0.6546                       
U.K.  0.8458*  0.7980*  0.7781* 0.6752* 0.4851  0.6493* 0.3811  0.474  1            
  0.0041 0.0176 0.0135 0.0662 0.1856 0.0584 0.3116 0.1973                     
ITA  0.7405*  0.9141*  0.5988* 0.3987  0.2416  0.5217  0.1896  0.5404  0.9242* 1           
  0.0225 0.0015 0.0885 0.3279 0.5312 0.1497  0.625  0.1331 0.0004                   
MEX  0.7512*  0.7418*  0.7924* 0.592  0.7514* 0.7466* 0.6319* 0.2406  0.6997* 0.4684  1          
  0.0196 0.0351 0.0109 0.1221 0.0196 0.0208 0.0679 0.5328 0.0359 0.2034                 
NOR  0.6867*  0.5594  0.8446* 0.7494* 0.6478* 0.6138* 0.7292* -0.0034 0.5221  0.4104  0.5796  1         
  0.041  0.1494 0.0042 0.0323 0.0592 0.0787 0.0258 0.9931 0.1494 0.2725 0.1019               
NZL  0.7406*  0.7095*  0.9325* 0.5384  0.3666  0.5507 0.381 0.1883  0.8385* 0.7810* 0.6487*  0.7522* 1           
  0.0225 0.0487 0.0002 0.1686 0.3319 0.1244 0.3116 0.6276 0.0047  0.013  0.0587 0.0194             
PRT 0.8199*  0.6480*  0.6388* 0.9464* 0.8976* 0.8252* 0.6106* 0.3994 0.6195* 0.4972 0.6074*  0.7553* 0.5234  1         
  0.0068  0.0823  0.0641  0.0004 0.001 0.0062  0.0807 0.287 0.0752  0.1733  0.0828  0.0186  0.1481           
SWE -0.3965  -0.0402  -0.4902 -0.5221 -0.4272 -0.1074 -0.7092* 0.2275  -0.3983 -0.3543 -0.3031  -0.5835* -0.4148 -0.5632 1       
  0.2907 0.9247 0.1804 0.1844 0.2515 0.7833 0.0324 0.5561 0.2883 0.3495 0.4278  0.099  0.267  0.1143         
URY  0.7016 0.7416*  0.8984* 0.1322 0.3454 0.4883 0.5087 0.1164 0.8908* 0.7575* 0.8471*  0.8882* 0.9065* 0.25  0.0069  1     
  0.1203 0.0915  0.015  0.8028 0.5025 0.3257 0.3028 0.8261 0.0172 0.0811 0.0333 0.0181 0.0127 0.6328 0.9896       
U.S. 0.7816*  0.7760*  0.9482* 0.6749* 0.554  0.7045* 0.3825  0.2482  0.8546* 0.7129* 0.8062* 0.6971* 0.9386* 0.6213* -0.3562   0.8369* 1   
  0.0129 0.0236 0.0001 0.0663 0.1217 0.0341 0.3096 0.5195 0.0033 0.0311 0.0087 0.0369 0.0002 0.0741 0.3468 0.0377     
VEN  0.5296 0.3722 0.7044* 0.9202* 0.7273* 0.5721  0.449 -0.0185 0.4039 0.1661 0.4535 0.7265* 0.5162 0.7543* -0.4427 -0.0208 0.6283* 1 
  0.1426 0.3639 0.0341 0.0012 0.0264 0.1075 0.2254 0.9624  0.281  0.6693 0.2202 0.0266 0.1548 0.0189 0.2327 0.9688  0.07   
Anglo Saxon  0.8195*  0.7535*  0.9589* 0.6836* 0.5243  0.6601* 0.466  0.2501 0.9111* 0.7922* 0.7696*  0.7424* 0.9717* 0.6310* -0.4432 0.9400* 0.9761* 0.5890*
  0.0069 0.0309  0  0.0616 0.1474  0.053  0.2061 0.5163 0.0006 0.0109 0.0153  0.022  0  0.0684 0.2322 0.0053  0  0.0952
All    0.9294* 0.8579* 0.9097* 0.7871* 0.7550* 0.8514* 0.5677  0.4149  0.8733* 0.7244* 0.8667* 0.7854* 0.8618* 0.8068* -0.4024   0.8786* 0.9286* 0.6358*
    0.0003 0.0064 0.0007 0.0204 0.0187 0.0036 0.1108 0.2668 0.0021 0.0273 0.0025 0.0121 0.0028 0.0086  0.283  0.0212 0.0003 0.0657
Notes: Job reallocation is the sum of job creation and job destruction.   The first line indicates the correlation coefficient 
and the second the significance level (p-value), 
significant at the 10 per cent level.   All pair-wise correlations are estimated with either 8 or 9 observations (depending 
whether we have information for sector 39 ISIC Rev2),   
except in Uruguay where there are only 6 sectors with more than 40 firms. Anglo Saxon is the simple average of sector 
job reallocation for Canada, U.K., New Zealand and U.S.   
 All is the simple average of sector job reallocation for all countries.    
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                      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Sum Sum Sum Sum Sum Sum Sum Sum Sum Sum
JS  Bot.                      -10.655 -2.927 -14.862 -10.146 -10.270 20.294 -7.655 -8.322 14.158 -8.538
  (9.273)                    (5.266) (8.312) (6.225) (5.834)c (8.650)b (5.326) (4.563)c (7.311)c (5.764)
Rule of Law (RL)      -7.487  -3.231  -1.950  16.048  1.230  1.624     
          (5.354)  (1.538)c  (1.010)c  (6.673)b  (3.706)  (3.274)
JS  Bot.* RL                -48.322  -7.309  -6.277
             (10.987)a  (6.155)  (6.135)
Gov.  Efficiency (GE)                  15.164 1.163
             (4.910)b  (3.469)
JS Bot. * GE                  -48.869  -8.562 
             (10.973)a  (6.281)
GDP  growth  volatility                      2.510 2.152 3.174 1.745 1.006 3.327 1.844 1.416 2.980 1.935
  (3.414)                    (1.124)c (2.499) (0.971)c (0.543)c (1.386)b (0.820)b (0.594)b (1.323)b (0.847)b
Entry/Exit  dummy                      0.000 17.294 0.000 20.006 14.844 0.000 18.391 15.493 0.000 19.695
  (0.000)                    (3.758)a (0.000) (3.821)a (1.948)a (0.000) (3.916)a (2.007)a (0.000) (4.184)a
Plant Dummy   -3.384  -2.834  1.144  -1.481  -1.629            -7.199 -2.249 -2.945 -6.332 -2.694
  (3.389)                    (1.342)b (4.770) (1.504) (1.361) (3.162)b (1.501) (1.279)b (3.160)c (1.455)c
Constant                      22.943 7.280 24.504 8.223 13.741 13.522 7.771 11.489 15.929 7.144
  (4.225)a                    (6.600) (4.200)a (5.453) (3.999)a (3.553)a (4.980) (3.347)a (2.968)a (5.011)
Observations                      99 157 99 157 158 99 157 158 99 157
R-squared                      0.31 0.49 0.37 0.56 0.63 0.53 0.58 0.64 0.50 0.59
Sector FE                         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample                      Dev. ALL Dev. ALL ALL* Dev. ALL ALL* Dev. ALL
                     
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (Clustered by Country).  c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. JS Bot.is the Job 
Security Index developed by Botero, Djankov, La Porta et al. (2003). RL =Rule of Law and GE = Government Efficiency, both are institutional variables 
from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003). Entry/Exit is dummy that indicates whether the entry and exit of firms can be observed in the data set. Plant 
is a dummy for the unit of observation (1 plants, 0 firms) *For Brazil and Mexico we use the manufacturing census data (only continuous plants) instead of 
the registry information. Dev. denotes developed countries. 
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                                    Table 5. Job Reallocation and Job Security: Differences-in-Differences 
                        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Sum Sum Sum Sum Sum  (ln)  Sum  (ln) Sum Sum Sum Sum Sum  (ln)
USA  SUM*JS Bot.                   -1.041 -1.742     -2.327  
  (0.423)b  (0.456)a                  (0.457)a
AS  SUM*JS Bot.                     -1.377  
                   (0.318)a
Exc.  USA  SUM*JS Bot.                      -1.854
                  (0.628)a
Index  USA  SUM*JS Bot.                       -0.053  -0.079 -0.092
                  (0.020)a  (0.024)a (0.026)a
USA  SUM*  Job.  Sec. HP.                     -0.243  
                    (0.130)c
USA  SUM*EPL_90                   -0.245
                 (0.116)b 
USA  SUM*EPL_80                    -0.228
                   (0.114)b
USA  SUM*Income  (GDPpc)                     -0.333 -0.369 -0.738 -0.666 -0.220
                      (0.131)b (0.210)c (0.359)b (0.364)c (0.127)c
AS  SUM*  Income  (GDPpc)               -0.253      
                   (0.102)b
Exc.  USA  SUM*GDPpc                   -0.453
                  (0.181)b
Index  USA  SUM*GDPpc                    -0.013 -0.010
                  (0.008)  (0.008)
Observations                        148 148 157 148 148 148 148 90 81 149 149
R-squared                        0.83 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.83 0.76 0.70 0.86 0.89
Country  and  Sector FE                           Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample  All                     All All+USA All All All All Dev. Dev. All* All*
Diff.  In  Job  Real.  P90-P10                        -5.813 -9.728 -11.661 -12.359 -0.280 -0.417 -6.949 -7.25 -7.52 -12.9 -0.48
Diff.  In  Job  Real.  P80-P20                        -4.412 -7.383 -6.425 -4.628 -0.165 -0.246 -4.694 -5.59 -5.57 -9.86 -0.28
                    
Notes: Robust standard errors. Sectors are defined at the 2 digit ISIC (rev 2). c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. All 
regressions have sector and country fixed effects. USA SUM denotes Sector Job Reallocation in USA; Index USA SUM denotes the ranking of U.S. 
Sector Job Reallocation; AS SUM= Simple average of Sector Job Reallocation for U.S., Canada, U.K., and New Zealand. JS Bot. is the Job Security 
Index developed by Botero et. al. (2003). Job Sec. HP is the Job Security Index developed by Heckman and Pagés (2003).  Sample All includes all 
countries but the U.S. Sample Dev. only includes developed countries. Sample All*  includes manufacturing census data (only continuous plants) for 
Brazil and Mexico, instead of the Social Security registry information.  Diff. In Job Real.  p90-p10 measures the decline in job reallocation (in 
percentage points) of an industry at the 90th percentile level of flexibility requirement relative to an industry at the 10th percentile level when such 
industries are located in a country at the 90th percentile of job security regulation rather than at the 10th percentile.  
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                    (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Sum  Sum Sum  Sum (ln)    Sum (ln)  Sum (ln)  Sum Sum Sum
USA SUM* JS Bot. 
 
-0.789  -2.608  -2.100     -1.503  -1.698  -1.421 
       
          
         
             
         
   
        
     
          
             
(0.907)  (0.749)a  (0.518)a (0.620)b  (1.851)  (1.345)
Index USA SUM* JS Bot. 
 
      -0.087  -0.116  -0.078       
(0.048)c  (0.050)b  (0.027)a
Index USA SUM* JS Bot*Rule of Law 
 
            -0.729  -3.148  -1.224 
(0.644)  (2.076)  (1.698)
USA  SUM*  Rule  of  Law
 






  USA SUM*Income (GDPpc) 
 






  Index  USA  SUM*Income  (GDPpc)
 






  Observations 58 59 90 58 59 90 148 58 90
R-squared
   
  0.93                 
                 
             
0.94 0.78 0.94 0.93 0.78 0.84 0.93 0.78
Sample LAC LAC* Dev. LAC LAC* Dev. All LAC Dev.
Country & Sector FE  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
       
Notes: Robust standard errors. c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. All regressions have Sector and 
Country fixed effects.   USA SUM denotes sector job reallocation in U.S., Index USA SUM denotes a ranking of sector job 
reallocation in U.S. JS.Bot, is the Job Security Index developed by Botero, Djankov, La Porta et al. (2003). Rule of Law is 
developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003).   Sample All * uses manufacturing census data  (continuous plants only) 
for Brazil and Mexico instead of the Social Security registry information. 
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Table 7. Correlation between Job Security and Cost of Entry and Exit Measures 
 
Absolute 
Priority  CEE1       CEE2 JS  (Bot.)
JS 
(HP)
Absolute Priority  1           
CEE1             
             
       
           
-0.5406* 1
CEE2 -0.4624*0.5001* 1
JS Bot.  -0.4937* 0.3149*0.4922*  1     
HP -0.6324*  0.7072*
 
0.3890*0.7354* 1
* indicates significance at 10%. 
Notes: CEE1 denotes average cost of firm entry and exit measured in years, while CEE2 denotes average cost of 
entry and exit entry, measured according to a simple average of cost of in number of procedures to open a firm and 
cost of exit, measured as a percentage of the insolvent estate, once both have been standardized between 0 and 1. 
Absolute Priority documents the order in which claims are paid in the insolvency process, including payment of 
post-petition claims. Higher values of this measure indicate higher priority for creditors’ claims. JS Bot.  Is the job 
security measure developed by Botero, Djankov, La Porta et al. (2003).  HP is the Job Security measure developed 
by Heckman and Pagés (2003)  
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                  Table 8. Job Security versus Firm Entry and Exit Regulations: Differences-in-Differences  
         
 
     Sum  Sum Sum Sum Sum Sum Sum Sum 
USA SUM*JS Bot.  -1.698  -1.605  -1.894  -1.711          -1.681 -2.764 -1.287 -0.421
  (0.469)a         
                 
            
                
             
           
          
               
            
               
         
             
      . 6 1 )      
            
       . 5 3 )    
             
       . 0 2 )  
           
           
                 
(0.518)a (0.495)a (0.469)a (0.499)a (0.844)a (0.657)c -1.59
USA SUM*CEE1  -0.095          -0.593     
(0.11) (0.43)
  USA SUM*CEE2 -0.727   -0.222
(0.65) (1.45)














USA SUMbirth&death*Income (GDPpc) 
 
               












USA Sum*Income (GDPpc) 
 
-0.398  -0.442  -0.205 -0.375 -0.382 -0.482 -0.469 -0.183
(0.163)b (0.174)b (0.13) (0.148)b (0.153)b (0.180)a (0.177)a (0.13)
Observations 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
R-squared  0.84                0.85 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85
Country and Sector FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors. c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. CEE1 denotes average cost of entry and exit 
measured in years, while CEE2 denotes average cost of entry and exit according to a simple average of cost of entry, measured in number of 
procedures to follow to open a firm, and cost of exit, measured as percentage of the insolvent estate, once both measures have been 
standardized between zero and one. Abs. Priority documents the order in which claims are paid in the insolvency process, including payment 
of post-petition claims. Higher value of this variable reflects higher priority for creditors. USA SUM denotes sector job reallocation in U.S. 
Index USA SUM denotes a ranking of sector job reallocation in U.S.USA SUMbirth&death denotes sector job reallocation in U.S. due to the 
birth and death of firms. JS Bot. Is the Job Security Index Developed by Botero, Djankov, La Porta et al. (2003).  See text and Table A.1 for 
data sources of firm entry and exit regulations measures.  
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Table 9. Robustness to Changes in the Sample of Countries: Differences-in-Differences 
  Dependent Variable  SUM  Dependent Variable SUM (ln) 
 
USA SUM*JS 
Bot.   (Robust S.E.)  Observations  R-squared 
Index USA 
SUM*JS 
Bot.   (Robust S.E.)  Observations  R-squared 
Without Argentina  -1.769  (0.457)a  139  0.84  -0.079  (0.024)a  139    0.86
Without Brazil  -1.799  (0.472)a  140  0.82  -0.077  (0.024)a  140  0.85 
Without Canada  -1.555  (0.495)a  139  0.85  -0.069  (0.025)a  139  0.87 
Without Chile  -1.664  (0.439)a  140  0.85  -0.072  (0.022)a  140  0.88 
Without Colombia  -1.735  (0.455)a  139  0.85  -0.078  (0.024)a  139  0.87 
Without Germany  -1.856  (0.492)a  139  0.83  -0.092  (0.025)a  139  0.86 
Without Finland  -1.779  (0.500)a  139  0.84  -0.077  (0.026)a  139  0.87 
Without France  -1.737  (0.451)a  139  0.86  -0.079  (0.024)a  139  0.89 
Without UK  -1.642  (0.479)a  139  0.84  -0.079  (0.025)a  139  0.86 
Without Italy  -1.588  (0.437)a  139  0.86  -0.074  (0.023)a  139  0.87 
Without Mexico  -2.036  (0.449)a  139  0.85  -0.085  (0.024)a  139  0.86 
Without Norway  -1.752  (0.461)a  139  0.84  -0.079  (0.024)a  139  0.87 
Without New Zealand  -1.776  (0.567)a  139  0.83  -0.096  (0.028)a  139  0.86 
Without Portugal  -1.834  (0.518)a  139  0.84  -0.078  (0.028)a  139  0.86 
Without Sweden  -1.584  (0.429)a  139  0.87  -0.07  (0.024)a  139  0.89 
Without Uruguay  -1.902  (0.514)a  142  0.84  -0.076  (0.028)a  142  0.86 
Without Venezuela  -1.656  (0.454)a  139  0.82  -0.081  (0.024)a  139  0.83 
Notes: In parenthesis robust standard errors. c, b and a significant at 10%; 5% and at 1%. Each coefficient is obtained from a separate regression 
which, in addition to the interaction variable whose coefficient is reported in this table, it includes the variables contained in Table 5 Column (2), that 
is, country and sector fixed effect and an interaction term that multiplies USA SUM*Income (GDPpc), where USA SUM denotes U.S. sector labor 
reallocation and Income is GDP per capita. Index USA SUM refers to a ranking of sector reallocation across U.S. Sectors. JS Bot. refers to the Job 
Security Measures created by Botero, Djankov, La Porta et al. (2003). 
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                                Table 10. Robustness to Exclusion of Sectors: Differences-in-Differences 
  Dependent Variable SUM  Dependent Variable SUM (ln) 
 
USA SUM* 
JS Bot.  
(Robust




S.E.)  Observations    R-squared
Without sector 31  -1.701  (0.466)a 131  0.85  -0.076  (0.024)a  131  0.87 
Without sector 32  -1.982  (0.515)a 131  0.84  -0.08  (0.026)a  131  0.86 
Without sector 33  -2.103  (0.503)a 132  0.83  -0.091  (0.024)a  132  0.86 
Without sector 34  -1.757  (0.567)a 131  0.84  -0.076  (0.036)b  131  0.86 
Without sector 35  -1.804  (0.479)a 131  0.83  -0.085  (0.026)a  131  0.86 
Without sector 36  -1.767  (0.463)a 131  0.85  -0.081  (0.024)a  131  0.87 
Without sector 37  -1.733  (0.441)a 132  0.87  -0.081  (0.021)a  132  0.91 
Without sector 38  -1.737  (0.454)a 131  0.84  -0.077  (0.024)a  131  0.87 
Without sector 39  -1.088  (0.456)b 134  0.86  -0.057  (0.027)b  134  0.87 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses; c, b and a significant at 10%; 5% and at 1%. Each coefficient is obtained 
from a separate regression which, in addition to the interaction variable whose coefficient is reported in this table, includes 
the variables contained in table 5 Column (2), that is, country and sector fixed effect and an interaction term that multiplies 
USA SUM*Income (GDPpc), where USA SUM denotes U.S. sector labor reallocation and Income is GDP per capita. Index 
USA SUM refers to a ranking of sector reallocation across U.S. Sectors. JS Bot. refers to the Job Security Measures created 
by Botero, Djankov, La Porta et al. (2003). 
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Figure 1. Partial Regression: Job Reallocation versus the Interaction 
of U.S. Job Reallocation and Job Security 
 
(Controlling for Country, Sector and Income Effects. (Regression 2 in Table 5)) 
  coef = -1.7420591, (robust) se = .45570554, t = -3.82 
Sum 
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